| Journal Article |
A Successful Story: Leniency and (International) Cartel Enforcement in Japan. |
T Nambu |
2014 |
Since its introduction in 2005, the Japanese leniency programme has made it possible to detect and prosecute an increasing number of anticompetitive practices.This has strengthened the capacity of the Japanese competition authority to act against domestic but also international violations of competition rules. |
4 |
| Journal Article |
An Exploratory Study of the Variation in Japan's Embezzlement Rates via Institutional Anomie Theory1 |
MF Aranha, GW Burruss |
2010 |
(abstract not available) |
4 |
| Journal Article |
Book Review Essay: How Compliance is Ruining Japan |
CPA Jones |
2007 |
(abstract not available) |
4 |
| Other |
Comparing media relations in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States: A metaresearch analysis |
MY Wu |
2011 |
(abstract not available) |
4 |
| Journal Article |
Concentrated Power: The Paradox of Antitrust in Japan |
H First, T Shiraishi |
2005 |
Abstract
Many reasons have been given for weak antitrust enforcement in Japan. In this paper we explore one reason that has been overlooked - the concentration of enforcement authority in Japan's Fair Trade Commission.
The paper begins with a description of Japan's antitrust enforcement system, with a particular focus on the current position and activities of the JFTC. We then compare Japan's system to the antitrust enforcement system that has evolved in the United States, primarily to provide the contrast of a system where enforcement is more deconcentrated and enforcers operate in a networked environment rather than in a hierarchical one. We conclude with three suggestions for opening up antitrust enforcement in Japan: Increase the networking of the JFTC and other ministries regarding competition matters; strengthen the support structure for private litigation; and encourage the JFTC to participate fully in the growing internationalization of antitrust enforcement. |
4 |
| Journal Article |
Exporting a Japanese model? Collusion in the foreign aid program |
DM Potter |
1998 |
(abstract not available) |
3 |
| Other |
Japan Bar Association Issues New Anticorruption Compliance Guidelines |
JE Hough, C Yakura |
2016 |
(abstract not available) |
3 |
| Other |
A Declining Technocratic Regime: Bureaucracy , Political Parties and Interest Groups in Japan, 1950-2000 |
T Nakamura |
2002 |
(abstract not available) |
3 |
| Journal Article |
Case studies of bid - rigging and procurement reform assessment in fuel oil supply in Japan and Korea |
K Arai |
2012 |
In November 1999, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission took legal action against participants in bids for oil delivery work ordered by the Self-Defense Forces. Then, in September 2000, the Korean Fair Trade Commission took legal action against participants in bids for oil delivery work ordered by the Korean Ministry of National Defense. These actions were not related, though there are similarities between the cases, each of which involves oil delivery companies obtaining special procurement privileges through deals with national security authorities. Study of these cases led to speculation as why the industry is conductive to collusion. According to the study three important results were recognized: Several measures in the plan for Japanese and Korean procurement reform were then analyzed. The implementation can clarify issues that are important for eradicating the participantsyʼ incentives for collusion. |
3 |
| Journal Article |
Collusion between public procurers and suppliers in the context of japan's public procurement: The role of the risks of “unsuccessful procurement” |
S Tanaka, S Hayashi |
2016 |
This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption. |
3 |
| Book |
Contributions, covenants, and corruption: Politicians and society in Japan |
S Pharr |
2005 |
(abstract not available) |
3 |
| Journal Article |
Deterrence of Antitrust Violations: Do Actions for Damages Matter in Japan? |
SV Walle |
1985 |
There is considerable debate about the role private litigation should play in the enforcement of antitrust law. This article focuses on one of the most controversial private enforcement mechanisms – damages actions – and assesses whether and how much such actions have contributed to deterring antitrust violations in Japan. It does so by answering two questions: (1) how much have damages actions contributed to the detection of antitrust violations?, and (2) how much have damages actions contributed to an increase in the sanctions for antitrust violations? Based on original data concerning damages actions between 1990 and 2010, the article argues that damages actions have somewhat contributed to deterring certain antitrust violations, bid-rigging in particular, but that an almost equivalent measure of deterrence could have been generated more efficiently by imposing higher penalties through public enforcement. |
3 |
| Other |
Collusion in fuel oil public bidding: Analytical case studies in Japan and Korea |
K Arai |
2004 |
(abstract not available) |
2 |
| Journal Article |
Corruption in Japanese Defense Procurement : A Game-theoretic Analysis |
T Mizoguchi, N Van Quyen |
2008 |
The Japanese defense market is an oligopoly. Firms in the defense industry also produce civilian goods, and the revenues they obtain from defense contracts are quite small relative to the revenues coming from the production of private goods. Because the Japanese constitution prohibits arms export, the defense industry in Japan essentially serves an internal market. Furthermore, defense contracts are not awarded on a competitive basis. The procurement procedures rely on cost-plus contracts, most of which are carried out at the discretion of the bureaucrats in charge. Information on prices and contracts thus become extremely opaque, which makes it easier for misuse and corruption to flourish. The paper presents a game that incorporates these features of the defense procurement process. The results of the analysis suggest that the government pay for low-quality defenses goods at inflated prices. Furthermore, because Japanese firms are shielded from competition and because of the lack of a large foreign market, the Japanese defense industry has no incentive to engage in R&D to improve the quality of its defense goods. |
2 |
| Journal Article |
Culture versus Competition: Economic Liberalization in Russia, China, and Japan |
S Rosefielde Problems of Post |
2002 |
(abstract not available) |
2 |
| Journal Article |
How Japan's Lobbyists in the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System |
P Choate |
1990 |
(abstract not available) |
2 |
| Journal Article |
Study on the Crime of Commercial Bribery between China and Japan [J] |
C Jialin |
2006 |
Both China and Japan are paying attention to fighting against commercial bribery,but there are some different rules in the two criminal laws.In Japan,the crime of bribery concerning public officers is ordained in criminal law while crimes of commercial bribery are included in accessory criminal law.The descriptions on the constitution elements of commercial bribery in criminal law are much stricter than those on crimes of bribery concerning public officers.The above mentioned descriptions in Japanese law can be used for reference in the legislation and interpretation of crime of commercial bribery in China. |
2 |
| Other |
Value for Money or No value for money?: A Case of Public Sector Auditing in Japanese Local Government |
H Yoshimi |
2000 |
(abstract not available) |
2 |
| Journal Article |
Bribery Cases and the Rise of the Justice Ministry in Late Meiji-Early Taisho Japan |
R Yasko |
1979 |
(abstract not available) |
1 |
| Other |
Describing and explaining the administrative ethical climate of a country: the case of the Japanese bureaucracy |
J Maesschalck , D Vanoverbeke |
2005 |
(abstract not available) |
1 |
| Chapter |
Fighting against Corruption: The Japanese Approach to Reform Corporate Governance |
M Miyake, K Gordon, L Taka |
2003 |
The legal framework and enforcement apparatus used in the fight against bribery are being steadily improved in many countries. The public and private sectors in Japan have participated in this trend. This chapter provides an overview of changes in the anti-corruption legal framework and a snapshot of corporate initiatives to fight against corruption in Japan. |
1 |
| Other |
Japanese Bureaucratic Transparency |
TJ Pempel |
2012 |
(abstract not available) |
1 |
| Book |
Mediated by Gifts: Politics and Society in Japan, 1350-1850 |
M Chaiklin |
2016 |
(abstract not available) |
1 |
| Other |
Regulatory Capture in Public Procurement: Evidence from Revolving Door Bureaucrats in Japan |
K Asai , K Kawai, J Nakabayashi |
2016 |
(abstract not available) |
1 |
| Journal Article |
The Failure of the Japanese" Big Bang": Bureaucracy -Driven Reforms and Politician Intervention |
I Okamoto |
2005 |
The "financial big bang" of the late 1990s strove to fundamentally liberalize the Japanese financial system and create a free, fair, and global financial market. However, as is now evident from the stagnation of the stock market and the bad debt problems of Japanese banks, those reforms have not accomplished their desired ends. The question is: Why? This article attributes the failure of the big bang to the inability of the reforms to go beyond liberalizing the securities industry by challenging the government's protection of the banking sector, and to the government's haphazard intervention in the stock market. The article concludes that these are all problems of "financial gover-nance," that is, the reforms were "bottom-up," implemented at the initiative of the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and politicians intervened in financial administration after the MOF was broken up. |
1 |
