Journal Article |
Collusion in repeated procurement auction: a study of a paving market in Japan |
R Ishii |
2008 |
Abstract
We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation ofpotential outsiders. Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose winless period is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders. |
28 |
Journal Article |
Images of involvement and integrity : Rhetorical style of a Japanese politician |
SK Maynard |
1994 |
This paper analyzes a political discourse in the Japanese Diet focusing on the testimony given by the former Prime Minister, Noboru Takeshita, on 7 December 1992. Given the fact that Takeshita's rhetorical style—often referred to as Takeshita-go (`Takeshita-speak')—is dubbed as gengo meiryoo, imi fumei (`clear-in-language, unknown-in-meaning'), in this paper I investigate the former Prime Minister's speech style and question what it is that causes his particular style of speech to be characterized as such. I analyze the tape-recorded hearing and identify various pragmatic strategies to achieve `involvement' and `integrity'. These devices include, among others, politeness expression, self-quotation, quotative explanation, repetition, lexical choice and lexical (re-)definition, and strategies to humble oneself. An overall pragmatic strategy that Takeshita-speak favors is juxtaposing different semiotic contexts: the ordinary and the institutional as well as the linguistic and the metalinguistic. I conclude that juxtaposition of semiotic contexts along with involvement and integrity strategies plays a significant role in characterizing Takeshita-speak as `clear-in-language, unknown-in-meaning'. Comments are made regarding the possible universal versus culturally relative nature of the pragmatics of the style, and theoretical implications of this study are suggested. |
28 |
Journal Article |
Looks can be deceiving: A comparison of initial public offering procedures under Japanese and US securities laws |
AL Beller, T Terai, RM Levine |
1992 |
(abstract not available) |
27 |
Journal Article |
Administrative legislation in Japan: guidelines on scientific and ethical standards |
BT Slingsby, N Nagao, A Akabayashi |
2004 |
In the past few years, a second phase of biomedical ethics in Japan
has begun to surface with a succession of governmental guidelines and
laws regulating biomedical technology. Although this rush
of guidelines exemplifies a heightened awareness concerning ethical
standards for healthcare research, it also invites several practical,
political, and procedural problems. |
25 |
Journal Article |
Ethical climate and accountability in nonprofit organizations: A comparative study between Japan and the UK |
R Laratta |
2011 |
In a study aimed at shedding new light on the relationship between accountability and ethical climate in the nonprofit sector, a survey was carried out on executive directors in two groups of social services nonprofits in the UK and Japan. A close relationship was found between the way in which they perceived statutory accountability demands and their ability to identify downward accountability mechanisms and ethical climate in relation to ‘independence’ and ‘law and codes’. These findings provide a preliminary insight into the differences in the relationship between nonprofit organizations and government in the two countries. |
25 |
Journal Article |
Japan Fair Trade Commission guidelines concerning distribution systems and business practices: an illustration of why antitrust law is a weak solution to US trade … |
JD Richards |
1993 |
(abstract not available) |
25 |
Journal Article |
Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading |
SS Lu |
1991 |
(abstract not available) |
24 |
Journal Article |
Insider trading and executive compensation: Evidence from the US and Japan |
T Kato , KJ Hebner |
1997 |
The chief executive's expected total compensation consists of his expected insider trading profit and other explicit forms of CEO compensation. An insider trading model predicts that the expected insider trading profit decreases with the number of insiders, and hence that in the competitive labor market explicit forms of CEO compensation must increase with the number of insiders. The empirical prediction is tested using micro data on chief executives of 502 U.S. and 520 Japanese corporations. The results are largely in favor of the model. The strongest support is obtained when the number of insiders is proxied by the number of officers in the U.S. and the number of Yakuin in Japan. We also find for the U.S. that the positive relationship between the number of insiders and explicit forms of CEO pay does not depend on whether long-term compensation is considered and whether panel data are used to control for fixed effects. |
23 |
Chapter |
Public trust and corruption in Japan |
SJ Pharr |
2017 |
In this chapter, the author examines the experience of Japan with comparisons to other East Asian countries, notably South Korea. Looking in depth at Japan's experience, she offers a far more compelling explanation—corruption as a source of public mistrust. The author provides answer for this question: Why do corruption and other forms of misconduct on the part of leaders have such dire consequences for public trust? She shows that misconduct by politicians and bureaucrats has been by far the single best predictor of citizen confidence in government. No explanation for citizen disaffection with politics has greater currency among media pundits and political scientists alike than economic malaise. When times are good, the theory holds, citizens credit their leaders with wise economic policies. And deservedly or not, the public also holds leaders responsible for poor economic performance and registers dissatisfaction with government. |
22 |
Journal Article |
The international business ethics index: Japan |
J Tsalikis, B Seaton |
2008 |
The Business Ethics Index (BEI) was expanded in Japan. The overall BEI for Japan stands at 99.1 – slightly on the negative side. The component BEI patterns were similar to those in the U.S. In an open-ended question about their ethical experiences as consumers, the Japanese were concerned about customer service and good management practices. |
21 |
Chapter |
The reorganization of Japan's financial bureaucracy: The politics of bureaucratic structure and blame avoidance |
N Hiwatari |
2000 |
In September 1998 the Obuchi Cabinet decided to create the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC, Kinyû Saisei l’inkai), a new administrative body headed by a cabinet minister, to cope with Japan’s ailing banks. The council has under its jurisdiction the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA, Kinyû-Kantoku-chô), which is in charge of financial supervision, inspection, and policy-making. Once the FRC completes its mandate, it is expected to become the Finance Agency (Kinyû-Chô). The decision to create the FRC concluded a three-year debate over the breakup of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the exact authority of the Finance Agency was finally decided in April 1999. MOF’s financial arm, which underwent internal reorganization in the mid 1990s, is expected to become the Finance Agency. The agency will have what once were MOF’s financial responsibilities, except those pertaining to financial crises and the collapse of financial institutions, which will be co-managed with the’ new’ MOF. |
21 |
Journal Article |
Indider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese Equity Market into the Global Securities Market |
L Zoglin |
1987 |
(abstract not available) |
20 |
Journal Article |
Insider Trading Regulation: An Examination of Section 16 (b) and a Proposal for Japan |
K Ishizumi |
1978 |
(abstract not available) |
19 |
Journal Article |
Japan's Implementation of the OECD Anti- Bribery Convention: Weaker and less Effective than the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
DL Heifetz, PR Law |
2002 |
(abstract not available) |
19 |
Journal Article |
Lobby regulation in the Japanese diet |
RJ Hrebenar, A Nakainura, A Nakamura |
1998 |
(abstract not available) |
19 |
Journal Article |
Japan’s implementation of the OECD anti-bribery convention: weaker and less effective than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
DL Heifetz |
2002 |
(abstract not available) |
19 |
Journal Article |
Political Authority and Bureaucratic Resilience: Administrative perform in Japan |
S Furukawa |
1999 |
This article discusses the nature of administrative reform in Japan. It analyses government strategies of reform in relation to the nature of bureaucracy and political authority. There is interaction between bureaucrats and politicians, characterized by cooperation among those sharing common expertise. However, such cooperation results in weaker political authority over bureaucracy.
Administrative reform in Japan has not failed entirely, but it has been constrained by this lack of political authority. Radical marketization and civil service reform are not evident in Japan's experience of reform. The recent coalition governments have not exhibited the political authority necessary to implement practices reminiscent of NPM policies elsewhere. While some political realignment is evident, and some of the power of the bureaucracy has declined leading to a comparative advantage of political authority, public management in Japan may not be much different in the next century, apart from incremental changes due to the institutionalization of accountability and modest performance management measures. |
18 |
Journal Article |
Corruption in Japan-Institutionalizing the Right to Information, Transparency and the Right to Corruption-Free Governance |
CR Kumar |
2004 |
(abstract not available) |
17 |
Journal Article |
Government Transparency and Expenditure in the Rent‐Seeking Industry: The Case of Japan for 1998–2004 |
E Yamamura , H Kondoh |
2013 |
Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This article uses Japanese prefecture‐level data for the period 1998–2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture‐specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent‐seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory. (JEL D73, D78, H79) |
17 |
Journal Article |
A comparative institutional analysis of Korean and Japanese clientelism |
C Hee Park |
2008 |
Clientele networks are differently structured across nations, depending on the political institutional setup and the configuration of political and social forces. The political institutional setup, which is cross-nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. The configuration of political and social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in clientele networks and how effective they are for producing policy effects. A comparison of Korean and Japanese clientelism suggests that the Korean case represents a form of national-level, defensive, non-cumulative and high political-risk clientelism, while the Japanese case illustrates a form of local-level, cumulative and low political-risk clientelism. Korean clientelism is not a copy of the Japanese variant. Based on this analysis, the author suggests that not every social organisation is functional for democratic governance. He also points out that the gradual process of disintegrating clientele networks is on the move. |
16 |
Journal Article |
Conflicts of interest in Japanese insolvencies: the problem of bank rescues |
Y Miwa , JM Ramseyer |
2005 |
Economists and legal scholars routinely posit an implicit contract between Japanese firms and their principal lender (called their "main bank"). Under this arrangement, the bank implicitly agrees to rescue the firm (through financial and managerial help) when times turn bad. Out of court, it rescues the firm from insolvency. Not only does it save the investments specific to the troubled firm, it lowers the use of costly bankruptcy proceedings and cuts the costs of those bankruptcy procedures firms do occasionally invoke. Given the creditor-shareholder conflicts of interest that arise as firms approach insolvency, such arrangements would seem unstable. Yet according to a long sociological tradition, conflicts of interest matter less in Japan than in the West. According to the emerging economic and legal tradition, Japanese economic actors do face those conflicts, but keep them in check through reputational concerns, close-knit ties, and government supervision. Using two datasets of troubled firms from the 1970s and 1980s, we ask whether Japanese main banks in fact rescue distressed borrowers. We find no evidence that they do: large Japanese firms fail; when large firms approach insolvency, main banks do not increase the share of the firm’s debt they bear; stronger ties between distressed firms and their main bank do not facilitate loans; and troubled firms do not try to preserve their main bank relationship. All told, the claim that Japanese banks ever implicitly agreed to rescue firms is sheer myth. That Japanese banks let troubled firms fail is no recent development; it has been thus for decades. Conflicts of interest do indeed matter in Japan and long have. They matter enough to prevent precisely the incentive-incompatible rescue deals that scholars in the field so routinely posit. |
16 |
Journal Article |
Impact of the popular legal participation on forced confessions and wrongful convictions in Japan's bureaucratic courtroom: A cross-national analysis in the US and … |
H Fukurai , K Kurosawa US |
2010 |
(abstract not available) |
16 |
Journal Article |
Antitrust in Japan: recent trends and their socio-political background |
K Sanekata |
1986 |
(abstract not available) |
15 |
Journal Article |
Internal party organization in the Italian Christian democrats and Japanese liberal democrats: factional competition for office, clienteles, and corrupt exchange |
J Kato, C Mershon |
2017 |
How do competing factions within a party try to use control over executive office
to further their search for electoral support? Under what conditions does the
manipulation of office in the quest for electoral security lead to, or transform itself
into, corruption? |
14 |
Journal Article |
Japan's construction lobby and the privatization of highway-related public corporations |
T Feldhoff |
2007 |
There are many subjects currently debated in the ongoing discussion about
Japan’s approaches to structural reform. Nevertheless, the notorious ‘construction state’ still remains a basic puzzle of the Japanese political economy.
According to Broadbent (2002: 43), a construction state (doken kokka) can be
defined as a government which puts much more public investment into the construction of public works than can be realistically justified by public need. The
Japanese construction state is a phenomenon rooted in the prewar years.
However, it became outstanding from other industrialized countries especially in
the past two decades, as the level of public construction investment has grown
excessively (DeWit and Steinmo 2002: 172). At its heart, a system of collusion
between politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen can be identified that evolved
under Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) long-term one-party rule in postwar
Japan. These actors are linked by an extensive network of formal and informal
ties and are bound in a so-called ‘iron triangle’ of benefit and influence
(Woodall 1996; McCormack 2002; Feldhoff 2005). |
14 |